Why philosophers cannot handle psychoanalytic theory
The upsetting irony of the philosopher's appropriation
This post is dedicated to dissing all purist philosophers who view their “conquering” of psychoanalytic theory (more accurately described as appropriation, as they are familiar with the big names, terms, and arguments, and have stopped there) as yet another accomplishment, when, in actuality, it is a lamentable, fundamental insufficiency on their part.
A lamentable “accomplishment”
It is a hobby of many philosophers to critique psychoanalytic theory into the comfortable, medium-small-sized box they draw. Many philosophers believe in the limitations and boundaries of psychoanalytic theory as that of a largely hermeneutic and/or medical one. This is partially due to the ever-fast-paced-thinking philosopher’s conflation of psychoanalysis with psychoanalytic theory as one entity. It is also partially due to a compromised understanding of the word ‘(psycho)sexual’. I wish to stress that only a sociosymbolically mediated understanding of "sexual" as something extricably primal would result in taking offense to the libidinal economy. Many great philosophical thinkers reject the primacy of the psychosexual, partially due to their oblivion to their being chained to the ideological fantasy, and also partially due to a lack of emotional intelligence and/or self-awareness, to be frank.
One of the greatest hypocrisies of pure philosophers is their self-diagnosis of an ability to extend beyond the bounds of sociosymbolic hermeneutics, yet, when given the opportunity to challenge their bounds even further from other disciplines, they take smug pleasure in reducing all other disciplines to that of hermeneutics. On the other hand, psychoanalytic theorists are deftly able to harness many fields, including that of philosophy, in their own dialectical work.
To speak in terms of form and content, the philosopher’s form is to critique a lack of formal rigor in psychoanalytic theory, yet it is ironic in that what they are critiquing is a self-constructed appropriation of psychoanalytic theory, which was constructed with only content by the philosopher. In other words, the philosopher is critiquing both the act and product of their own creation, unbeknownst to them.
The form of philosophy is hypocritical
Read my Critique of Adorno’s Critique of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Art for a related line of thought.
The philosophical critique of psychoanalytic theory is ironic in that its critique takes the exact form of what it attempts to designate as the character of that which it is critiquing.
A more careful consideration of psychoanalytic theory would realize that it is not, in fact, appropriately reduced to a positivist approach. No other praxis is as comfortable with contradiction, paradox, and negative presences as that of psychoanalytic theory. One philosophical critique of psychoanalytic theory is that it has roots in fantasy and the wish for omnipotence. Nevermind the irony of a philosopher arguing for this; this critique fails to put a dent in psychoanalytic theory, as a more deft understanding of the form (not just the appropriated content) of psychoanalytic theory would lead one to realize that psychoanalytic theory embraces and retroactively contributes to itself from its roots in fantasy and contradiction. Philosophy, like a child, refuses to.
Furthermore, on the topic of fantasy—philosophy is chained to both the ideological fantasy, and, in recent years, the capitalist fantasy. Psychoanalytic theory largely does not find itself in this predicament.
Another habit I see is the philosopher’s gleeful recognition of a “seemingly” psychoanalytic concept (of course, appropriated out of its context and form) in “actuality,” “originally” being coined by a philosopher—one more point for the philosophers! Informed by a fundamental misordering, philosophers pave philosophical routes as alternatives to accounting for experiences and concepts belonging to the primacy of psychoanalytic theory.
In brief, the philosopher’s critique of psychoanalytic theory is hypocritical in several respects. First, it self-constructs a purely hermeneutic appropriation of psychoanalytic theory (or other fields), then proceeds to complain of said field’s entirely hermeneutic approach. Second, as if it has a libidinal economy of its own, philosophy represses its desire for omnipotence and/or ultimate primacy by accusing other fields of having this desire. Third, the logical base of philosophy is an intolerable one which places hindrances on its own formal rigor, namely its unfortunate cementation into the symbolic and/or conscious world—yet, like the first two points, it projects the intolerance and limitations to formal rigor onto other disciplines.
The purist philosopher is an extremely skilled and intelligent, yet extremely intolerant child that hugely lacks self-awareness.
The philosophical critique of psychoanalytic theory is a capitalistic one
In the first section of this essay, I used the word “conquering” to describe the relationship that purist philosophers have with psychoanalytic theory intentionally. You may have also noticed that I describe the philosopher’s attitude in terms of competition or game. I do this to implicitly convey the capitalistic motivations that underscore the philosophical critique of psychoanalytic theory.
Especially in recent years, the practice of philosophy, in its form, aligns with capitalistic values. A paradoxical precociousness yet stagnant immaturity in its formal rigor can be attributed to the philosopher’s value in ever-fast-paced-thinking and ideological abstraction. Unconcerned with the “inferiority” of world-subject-informed knowledge, philosophy rapidly becomes swept up in and prey to both the capitalist fantasy and the ideological fantasy.
As for the capitalist fantasy, it is not difficult to come across a philosopher who may personally deny it, but oozes with capitalist-informed-and-formed motivations. Although it manifests differently in philosophy as it does in all scenarios, the capitalist fantasy is sustained by an addiction to capitalistic affirmation, which is often disguised or naturalized as a “neutral” or “objective” ideal. Would it be inaccurate to describe many philosophers as addicts to an ever-elusive objectivity or “truth”? This is not unrelated to the ideological fantasy.
To define it in Lacanian terms, the capitalist fantasy's objet petit a, or object-cause of desire, is retroactively formed by the behavior of others who exude symptoms of being under the same fantasy. Its objet a, or symbolic substitute object of desire is capitalist affirmation, whether that be intelligible success or pseudo-political affirmation. Under the capitalist fantasy, there is no distinction between labor and individual value; the fetishization of 'genius' as an implicit capitalistic value takes place (often as the functioning objet a); the fetishization of a profound, specialized, and singular 'purpose' per individual takes place, and, alienated labor becomes romanticized.
Philosophers would likely not disagree with the denotation but rather the connotation of being associated with the ideological fantasy. Being unrestrained by worldly conditions is a valued part of the philosophical mindset. However, a failure to acknowledge subjectivity and state of being in the world leads to alienation and the ideological fantasy. The problem with the ideological fantasy is not only that it is an entirely negative substance—it is that this entirely negative substance takes on a positive function for the worse—disguised alienation at its finest. What was originally implemented as a way to “rise above” the world stays tragically cemented in the world, carried out by the purist philosophers who live in it.
I have previously described in this essay the field of philosophy as if it were a Lacanian subject with repressed desires. To return to this, the projection of the repressed desire for omnipotence and/or primacy onto others (which this desire itself is fed by the capitalist fantasy) is uncannily capitalistic, in the way that competing corporations possess the urge to consume one another.
The philosopher’s critique is unlike “general” critique—do not extricate it from its context and its desire.
I don’t doubt that many philosophers would consider themselves Marxists. I also don’t doubt that these "Marxists" are in a predicament of hypocrisy and romanticized alienated labor, disguised as unalienated labor.
There is much more I could say, but I am busy with finals, goodbye.
Loll ty